A POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR ACCESS MANAGEMENT IN FEDERATED INFORMATION SHARING by Rafae Bhatti et al.
CERIAS Tech Report 2005-42
A POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR ACCESS MANAGEMENT IN FEDERATED INFORMATION
SHARING 
by Rafae Bhatti, Elisa Bertino, Arif Ghafoor
Center for Education and Research in
 Information Assurance and Security,
Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN 47907-20861/11 
A Policy Framework for Access Management in Federated Information Sharing 
 
Rafae Bhatti, Elisa Bertino, Arif Ghafoor
   
Current mechanisms for distributed access 
management are limited in their capabilities to provide 
federated information sharing while ensuring adequate 
levels of resource protection. This work presents a policy-
based framework designed to address these limitations for 
access management in federated systems. In particular, it 
supports: (i) decentralized administration while preserving 
local autonomy, (ii) fine-grained access control while 
avoiding rule-explosion in the policy,(iii) credential 
federation through the use of interoperable protocols, (iv) 
specification and enforcement of semantic and contextual 
constraints, and (v) usage control in resource provisioning 
through effective session management. The paper 
highlights the significance of our policy-based approach in 
comparison with related mechanisms. It also presents a 
system architecture of our implementation prototype. 
 
1. Introduction 
Federated systems comprise of shared 
resources belonging to distributed, potentially 
mutually untrusted, administrative domains. A key 
property of federated systems is that each 
participating site retains local autonomy (i.e. 
administrative control over its resources), which is a 
main difference between federated and traditional 
distributed system concepts. Many commercial and 
government organizations are increasingly adopting 
the federated approach to online information 
management, be it for critical infrastructure 
protection such as the DoD NetCentric Directive [1] 
or wide dissemination of scholarly work such as the 
Federated Digital Library initiative [2].  
Access management in a federated system 
includes specification and administration of access 
control policies of protected information resources 
belonging to participating sites, and secure federation 
to allow seamless sharing of those resources. An 
effective mechanism for access management in such 
systems must take into consideration the access 
control requirements as stated in the access control 
policies of each participating site. However, several 
challenges arise in developing and enforcing access 
control policies in a federated paradigm. 
The principle of local autonomy impacts the 
ability of the federation to share and acquire 
resources [3]. A major problem in this context is 
policy administration. A centralized administration 
approach may imply loss of autonomy for 
participating sites [3], and is ruled out. On the other 
hand, decentralizing administrative control requires 
that participating sites specify authorization policies 
for federated users [3]. This approach preserves local 
autonomy, but is complicated by the fact that 
federated systems typically involve a diverse, unseen 
user pool requiring granular and differentiated access 
to a diverse set of resources located anywhere across 
the federation. It, therefore, precludes the use of 
traditional approaches to distributed authorization 
(such as X.509 based PKI) that assume knowledge of 
user identities and resource locations. Even when 
knowledge of identities is available, the requirement 
of fine-grained access control would lead to rule-
explosion in the access control policy given the size 
of federated population in open systems. To keep the 
rule set from becoming prohibitively large calls for a 
scalable approach.  
While decentralizing administrative control 
requires that participating sites specify authorization 
policies for federated users in an appropriate format, 
a related challenge is to transfer the credentials of the 
federated users across administrative boundaries for 
them to obtain federated resources according to the 
applicable authorization policies. We refer to such a 
mechanism as credential federation. No federated 
system can achieve its access management goals 
unless the requirement for credential federation is 
satisfied.  Doing so, however, requires interoperable 
protocols that can allow participating sites to federate 
user credentials. Multiple policies may be necessary 
to evaluate the request of a federated user, and 
requires the support for combining rules from 
multiple policies to support composite policy 
evaluation. A related requirement for credential 
federation is that of achieving Single Sign On (SSO), 
which enables persistent authorization support for 
federated users within a single login session.  
The “dual” of credential federation is 
resource federation, i.e. availability of resources to 
federated users according to the applicable 
authorization policies. Resource federation can occur 
in two modes, namely resource sharing and resource 
provisioning. Provisioning may be considered an 
advanced form of sharing where the resource is 
actually acquired (rather than just accessed) by the 
requestor for a specified period of time. It is assumed 
that the resource will remain within the immediate 
control of the owner during this time.  
While credential federation is aimed at 
securing the authorization information of federated 
users, resource federation takes a more usage-
oriented view, and is aimed at ensuring effective 
protection of accessed or acquired resources. For 
instance, a digital document acquired in a read-only 
mode by an authorized user for a specified period of 
time must be protected against any (unauthorized) 2/11 
modifications. In other words, the role of access 
control should not end after the resource is initially 
provided, but must persist for the duration of the 
provisioning session. Traditional access control 
models do not take a usage-oriented view, and hence 
are inadequate to capture the protection requirements 
associated with federated resource sharing.  
Lastly, the collaborative nature of a 
federated system requires the specification of 
semantic and contextual constraints to ensure 
adequate protection of federated resources. Semantic 
constraints include high level integrity principles that 
need to be captured in the access control policy, such 
as separation of privileges [4]. For instance, it may be 
required that no user may acquire the rights to access 
two design documents from two competing firms. 
Contextual constraints include temporal or other 
environmental attributes surrounding an access 
request that must be evaluated to decide on resource 
provisioning. For instance, a resource access between 
two domains may be time-constrained to occur only 
during business hours. Conditions associated with 
provisioning and de-provisioning of resources are 
absolutely critical to the functioning of the 
federation, especially when resources are provided 
against some form of obligation (such as service level 
agreements, etc.).  
Supporting semantic and contextual 
constraints in the access control policy requires 
mechanisms for constraint specification, evaluation 
and enforcement in a decentralized manner. While 
constraints increase the expressiveness of the policy, 
enforcing them requires maintaining state 
information across all user accesses, and is much 
more complex in a decentralized environment than in 
a centralized architecture. Reducing the complexity 
of policy administration, therefore, becomes an 
immediate concern [19]. Moreover, the integrity 
requirements and contractual obligations within a 
federation might change on-demand, and an access 
management mechanism must be flexible enough to 
facilitate such adaptation. 
All the above cited challenges are unique to 
the federated paradigm and need to be addressed to 
ensure effective access management. We believe that 
a policy-based approach to access management 
provides a viable solution since it is flexible and 
adaptable enough to meet these requirements. A key 
benefit of policies for systems management is that 
policies are interpreted rather than compiled into 
program code, so can be changed dynamically 
without changes to application code [20]. To realize 
this benefit, however, it is mandated that the policy 
supports an interoperable and expressive 
specification that can support these access 
management needs of a federated system. 
1.1 Contributions and organization 
The primary objective of this paper is to 
study the impact of these outlined challenges on the 
design and administration of an access control policy. 
In response, we present the design and enforcement 
architecture of a policy-based framework that 
addresses them. Our design builds upon the well-
known Role Based Access Control (RBAC) model 
which has been recognized for simplified 
administration [5] particularly in the context of 
federated access management [6], and augments it 
with necessary extensions to support access 
management in a federated system.  
In particular, we support the following key 
extensions to basic RBAC model: 
(i)  Delegated administration through the use of 
trust relationships captured through role 
hierarchies. Our approach provides scalable 
decentralization support and preserves local 
autonomy.  
(ii)  Credential specification for an unseen, 
heterogeneous pool of users and resources 
through a combination of rule-based role 
assignment and role-based authorization. 
Our approach allows fine-grained access 
control while avoiding rule-explosion in the 
policy. 
(iii)  Credential federation through the use of 
interoperable protocols. We support 
combing rules from multiple policies for 
composite policy evaluation, and also 
provide single sign on for federated users. 
(iv)  Usage control in resource provisioning by 
employing usage-oriented resource 
protection policies, and session management 
mechanism. 
(v)  Specification and enforcement of semantic 
and contextual constraints needed to support 
integrity requirements and contractual 
obligations in a federated system. Our 
approach achieves scalability and flexibility 
through modularized constraint specification 
and maintains reduced complexity through 
lazy rule instantiation. 
The remaining of the paper is organized as 
follows. Section 2 introduces design principles of our 
policy-based approach for access management in 
federated systems. Section 3 presents the details of 
the policy framework. Section 4 presents the system 
architecture of an implementation prototype of our 
proposed framework. We apply our policy 
framework in a federated digital library environment 
(with read-only access), and illustrate design and 
enforcement of access control policies for secure 
federation of XML-based digital documents. Section 
5 puts our work in perspective with related work, and 3/11 
highlights the particular merits of our work with 
respect to the outlined challenges. Section 6 
concludes the paper. 
2. Design Approach 
Recently, there has been a growing 
recognition of security problems in federated 
environments, and several emerging specifications in 
various stages of standardization have emerged [7-
10]. But standards alone won't solve the problem. 
The answer lies in combining standards with policies 
that govern how shared information can be used [11]. 
In this paper, we provide a policy-based solution 
specific to access management in federated systems 
with the motivation to address this crucial 
requirement. Among our design goals is to provide an 
interoperable specification for expressing access 
control policies that is compatible with emerging 
security standards for information federation.  
All notable emerging standards for Web-
based federation are XML-based; we therefore use an 
XML-based policy specification language. As a 
consequence, our policy based framework facilitates 
interoperability with complementary security 
protocols for federated systems. In addition to 
supporting high-level access control requirements, 
our language can be used to encode various low-level 
security policies (such as IPSec) through appropriate 
XSLT tools, and allow them to be applied in a 
federated system.  
Another design goal is to allow modular 
specification of authentication and authorization 
credentials to provide support for pluggable 
authentication standards to be incorporated. Being 
neutral to the authentication mechanism, we do not 
deal with the authentication system needed to 
generate the authenticator. In other words, we assume 
that the authentication information supplied to the 
system is already verified, and use that to create an 
authentication credential usable in our framework.  
Our design is focused on specification of 
policies, and therefore we do not consider certain 
other auxiliary issues. For example, we do not deal 
with credential provisioning issues, which include 
deployment of credentials across multiple 
applications, typically through the use of directory 
services (such as LDAP). We also do not deal with 
identity aggregation issues involving multiple LDAP 
repositories for manipulating composite 
authentication credentials. Additionally, we assume 
that the channels used for network communication 
are secured by appropriate mechanisms (such as 
SSL/TLS). 
3. X-GTRBAC Policy Framework 
  This section describes the key features of X-
GTRBAC (XML-based Generalized Temporal Role 
Based Access Control), our XML-based policy 
specification framework. Our specification language 
is an extension of the RBAC model suitable for 
addressing the access management challenges in 
federated systems discussed in this paper. 
3. 1.  Language Specification 
X-GTRBAC language specification is 
captured through a context-free grammar called X-
Grammar, which follows the same notion of 
terminals and non-terminals as in BNF, but supports 
the tagging notation of XML which also allows 
expressing attributes within element tags. The use of 
attributes helps maintain compatibility with XML 
schema syntax, which serves as the type definition 
model for our language. Since it follows BNF 
convention, X-Grammar can be accepted by a well-
defined automaton to allow automatic translation into 
XML schema documents. This allows automatic 
creation of strongly typed policy schemas based on 
the supplied grammar specification. We choose to 
use X-Grammar syntax instead of directly working 
with XML schemas for ease of analysis (since 
existing compiler tools for BNF grammars can be 
applied) and better readability and presentation. 
Examples of X-Grammar policies are given in 
following sections. The complete syntax of X-
GTRBAC language specification appears in 
Appendix A.  
3.2. Policy Components 
  We now describe the main components of 
our policy language. While doing so, we motivate our 
design decision by evaluating existing approaches 
against our stated requirements, and pointing out the 
merits of our design with respect to our objectives. 
3.2.1. Credentials 
Credentials are a key component of an 
access control language. A credential encodes the 
authentication and authorization information for the 
users. We have earlier motivated that a 
heterogeneous and unfamiliar user and resource pool 
in a federated system complicates credential 
specification, since it precludes the use of traditional 
approaches to distributed authorization (such as 
X.509 based PKI) that assume knowledge of user 
identities and resource locations.  
[12, 13] are well-known examples of 
distributed schemes that have used identity-based 
X.509 certificates for user authentication. The 
authentication information (i.e. public keys) is then 
used to construct an authorization credential that 
comprises of a set of resource-specific rules. The 
credentials are bound to user identities and therefore 
this approach to credential specification is not 
scalable. Even when knowledge of identities is 
available, the requirement of fine-grained access 
control would lead to rule-explosion in the access 
control policy given the size of federated population 4/11 
in open systems. Additionally, this approach tightly 
couples authentication with authorization, and is 
therefore inflexible, and violates one of our design 
principles. 
Our policy framework addresses this 
problem through the use of attribute-based (as 
opposed to identity-based) credential specification.   
We adopt a modular approach and allow independent 
specification of authentication and authorization 
credentials. The authentication credential comprises 
of user attributes which are used by the access control 
processor for role assignment. This idea is similar to 
the one used in [14]. However, unlike in [14], we do 
not require reliance on X.509 identity-based 
certificates to encode user authentication information. 
Instead, the user attributes may be supplied in any 
mutually agreed format, such as an “authentication 
assertion” in the emerging identity federation 
standard SAML [7]. This supports the requirement 
for credential federation (See Section 3.3.3). 
An authorization credential comprises of 
role attributes which are used by the access control 
processor for permission assignment to roles.   
Examples of role attributes are time of day, system 
load, etc. [16].  
The authentication and authorization 
credentials in our framework are included in an XML 
User Sheet (XUS) and an XML Role Sheet (XRS) 
respectively. The top-level X-Grammar syntax of 
XUS and XRS is shown in Figures 1 and 2. 
 
<!-- XML User Sheet>     ::= 
<XUS [xus_id = (id) ]>  
 < CredType cred_type_id=(id)  type_name= (name) > 
 [<!—Header>]   
  <!-- Credential Expression>   
 </CredType> 
</XUS> 
 
Figure 1: Top-level X-Grammar for XML User Sheet: 
Includes definition of authentication credential 
 
<!-- XML Role Sheet>   ::= 
<XRS [xrs_id = (id) ]>  
 <Role role_id = (id)   role_name = (role name)> 
[<!—Header>] 
<!-- Credential Expression>                                
    [<Junior> (name) </Junior>] 
    [<Senior> (name) </Senior>] 
    [<!—Delegation Constraint>]   
      (<SSDRoleSetID> (id) </SSDRoleSetID>)* 
 ( <DSDRoleSetID> (id) </DSDRoleSetID>)
1* 
 </Role>  
</XRS> 
 
Figure 2: Top-level X-Gramamr for XML Role Sheet: 
Includes definition of authorization credential 
                                                 
1 SSD and DSD refer to static and dynamic SoD respectively. 
  The credential specification in our 
framework facilitates a combination of rule-based 
role assignment and role-based authorization (See 
Section 3.2.3). Our approach allows fine-grained 
access control while avoiding rule-explosion in the 
policy since users are assigned to roles and access 
rules are specified at per-role rather than per-user 
level. 
3.2. 2. Constraints 
Constraints are essential to the 
expressiveness of an access control language. 
Specification of semantic and contextual constraints 
is vital to support the enforcement of integrity 
principles and resource provisioning contracts in a 
federated system. As motivated earlier, enforcing 
expressive constraints in a decentralized manner 
involves maintaining prohibitive amounts of state 
information and introduces significant complexity. 
Additionally, adapting the constraints according to 
on-demand changes in integrity requirements and 
contractual obligations within a federation requires a 
specification format that facilitates such adaptation. 
Most well-known distributed authorization 
schemes [12-15] do not cover the requirements of 
constraint specification and enforcement as required 
for access management in federated systems. As 
mentioned before, [12, 13] tightly couple resource-
specific authorization constraints with the identity-
information. This method of constraint specification 
is clearly inflexible to allow on-demand adaptation    
of constraints; doing so would require issuance of a 
new credential for the affected users since their 
identity is bound to the authorization.  
Additionally, constraints in [12, 13] are 
inadequate to capture semantic integrity constraints, 
such as SoD, in a federated system since doing so at 
the user level would require prohibitive amount of 
state information to be maintained. In comparison, 
enforcing SoD at the granularity of role is more 
manageable and one has to include in the constraint 
definition only the roles, as opposed to all 
permissions, that the user may have access to. The 
support for contextual constraints based on temporal 
or other environmental attributes is also limited in 
[12, 13], since they do not have a formal temporal 
model, and rely on underlying operating system 
primitives to enforce temporal constraints. [14, 15] 
are based on basic RBAC and do not support 
specification of contextual constraints.  
X-GTRBAC supports a variety of constraint 
categories to adequately capture the access 
management requirements in federated systems. The 
constraint specification in X-GTRBAC framework is 
primarily based on Generalized Temporal Role Based 
Access Control (GTRBAC) model [17]. GTRBAC is 
a generalized temporal mechanism to express a 5/11 
diverse set of fine-grained temporal constraints in an 
RBAC environment. The temporal constraint 
categories supported by GTRBAC include 
periodicity, interval, and duration constraints which 
can be used to constrain the period, interval and 
duration, respectively, of user-to-role and permission-
to-role assignments. Another category is that of 
trigger-based constraints, which can be thought of as 
condition-action rules. As the name implies, trigger-
based constraints are used to condition the occurrence 
of an event on another. Moreover, GTRBAC also 
elegantly captures the SoD constraint among roles to 
capture integrity requirements. Both static and 
dynamic SoD constraints are supported. Capturing 
these constraints at the role level helps reduce state 
information needed to enforce the constraints. 
X-GTRBAC supports modular specification 
of all the constraints in the GTRBAC model [18]. 
The modular approach allows independent 
specification of SoD and temporal constraint 
definitions which can then be imported into the 
policy through the use of XML namespaces. 
Specification of constraints separate from the policy 
allows reusable constraint definitions that can be used 
across multiple policies. Additionally, constraint 
definitions may be changed at one place without 
requiring change to all dependent policies, facilitating 
flexible adaptation.  
X-GTRBAC additionally supports the 
specification of contextual constraints based on non-
temporal attributes, usually associated with a role 
[16]. Contextual constraints on role attributes can be 
used in addition to temporal constraints to support 
finer granularity of control on user-to-role and 
permission-to-role assignments. 
Top-level X-Grammar syntax of SoD and 
temporal constraint definitions is shown in Figures 3 
and 4. The SoD constraints are included with the role 
definition in XRS (Figure 2), whereas the temporal 
constraints are included in assignment policies 
(Figure 6). An example XML instance of a temporal 
constraint definition appears in Appendix B. 
 
<!-- Separation of Duty Definitions> ::=       
    <XSoDDef [xsod_id = (id) ]>  
          <!—SoDRoleSets> 
 </XSoDDef> 
 
Figure 3: Top-level syntax of SoD constraint definition 
 
<!-- Definitions of Temporal Constraints>::=
  <XTempConstDef [xtcd_id = (id) ]>  
        [<!—Interval Expression>] 
    [<!-- Periodic Time Expression>]  
      [<!-- Duration Expression>] 
</XTempConstDef> 
 
Figure 4: Top-level syntax of temporal constraint definition 
Temporal constraints are of particular 
relevance to federated resource provisioning because 
it requires a set of fine-grained temporal constraints 
to adequately ensure resource protection while also 
ensuring its availability per the contractual 
requirements. This set includes constraints that 
control the periodicity, interval and duration of 
resource accesses (i.e. permission assignments) 
during and across provisioning sessions, in addition 
to trigger-based constraints that allow provisioning 
actions to be conditioned on related events. This 
represents a collection of stateful rules that can be 
configured in permission-to-role assignment policies. 
Doing so allows specification of usage-oriented 
resource protection policies to enforce usage control 
of federated resources.  
3.2.3. Assignment Rules 
  An integral component of RBAC polices in 
our framework is the specification of rules for user-
to-role and permission-to-role assignments. Rule-
based assignment in RBAC policies provides a 
succinct declarative specification that is both scalable 
and flexible. It avoids the problem of rule-explosion 
since rules are specified at per-role (as opposed to 
per-user or per-resource) level. It is flexible since a 
declarative syntax allows rules to be modified 
without changing application code. 
  As noted earlier, the authentication 
credential contains user attributes which are used by 
the access control processor for role assignment to 
users, whereas the authorization credential contains 
role attributes which are used by the access control 
processor for permission assignment to roles.  In our 
framework, a permission-to-role assignment policy 
also includes rules on resource attributes to allow 
specification of usage-oriented protection policy. 
Resource attributes capture semantic information (or 
meta-data) about resources, and avoid reliance on 
resource identity or location. To represent attributes 
of federated resources, we use application-specific 
attribute definitions (i.e. ontologies) that can be 
imported and referred to in the policy through the use 
of XML namespaces. The resource attributes are 
included in the object definition in an XML 
Permission Sheet (XPS). The top-level X-Grammar 
syntax of an XPS is shown in Figure 5. 
 
<!-- XML Permission Sheet>::= 
<XPS [xps_id = (id) ]> 
  <Permission perm_id = id  [prop= (prop op)] > 
    <Object type= (type name)  id= (id)> 
   [<!--  Attributes>]      
  </Object> 
    <Operation> (access op) </Operation> 
  </Permission>    
</XPS> 
 
Figure 5: Top-level X-Gramamr for XML Permission Sheet 6/11 
Our assignment policy schema specifies a 
logical expression syntax for rule specification. It 
does not, however, impose any restriction on the 
attributes that may be used for composing these rules. 
The existence and type checking of the queried 
attribute shall be done in an application-specific 
manner. For instance, user attributes can be verified 
through appropriate attribute authorities stated in the 
authentication credential.  
The assignment policies are specified in our 
framework in an XML User to Role Assignment 
Sheet (XURAS) and XML Permission to Role 
Assignment Sheet (XPRAS). The top-level X-
Grammar syntax of XURAS is shown in Figure 6 
(XPRAS is analogous). Note that these policies 
include references to temporal constraint definitions. 
For example, pt_expr_id references a periodic time 
expression. An example XML instance of a role 
assignment policy appears in Appendix B. 
 
<!-- XML User-Role Assignment Sheet>::= 
<XURAS [xuras_id = (id) ]> 
  <URA ura_id=(id) role_name=(name)>        
   <AssignUsers> 
     <AssignUser user_id=(id)>      
   < AssignConstraint[op =(AND|OR|NOT|XOR)]>  
  // opcode defaults to AND if none specified 
    <AssignCondition cred_type=(type name)                                   
   [pt_expr_id=(id) | d_expr_id=(id)] >      
     <LogicalExpr [op = (AND|OR|NOT)]>  
     // opcode defaults to AND if none specified 
       [<!-- Predicate>]+   
   </LogicalExpr> 
   </AssignCondition>    
     </AssignConstraint> 
  </AssignUser> 
 </AssignUsers> 
 </URA> 
</XURAS>    
 
Figure 6: Top-level syntax of user-to-role assignment policy 
 
A key feature of our rule specification 
format is the mechanism for combing rules from 
multiple policy sources for composite policy 
evaluation. Our logical expression syntax allows 
multiple logical expressions to be combined together 
in an appropriate rule combining mode. The modes 
supported by the evaluation engine in our prototype 
are AND (all rules must be true), OR (at least one 
rule must be true), and NOT (no rule must be true). 
Several levels of nesting are supported, each under a 
distinct mode, to allow a fine granularity of rule 
specification. We also note that the NOT mode 
essentially allows one to encode negative rules in our 
framework. 
3.3. Salient Features 
  In this subsection, we describe the salient 
features of our policy framework that enables the 
solution to access management challenges in 
federated systems outlined in the paper. These 
features build upon the policy components discussed 
in the previous subsection. 
3.3.1. Delegated Administration 
The requirement for local autonomy, and 
hence decentralization of administrative control, in 
federated systems poses major challenges in 
developing access control policies, as has been earlier 
discussed. The mechanisms for credential and 
constraint specification in our framework help 
alleviate part of this problem. The other aspect is 
related to the policy administration and enforcement 
mechanism. 
Decentralization of policy administration in 
X-GTRBAC is achieved through the notion of 
administrative domains. An administrative domain 
(or domain for short) is a unit of administrative 
authority. A federated system is then a multi-domain 
environment where each domain is responsible for 
managing the users and resources under its 
administrative control [16].  
Delegation of responsibilities is essential to 
scalable decentralization. Delegation in federated 
systems is captured through some form of trust 
relationships [12]. In X-GTRBAC framework, the 
notion of delegation is elegantly captured through the 
use of role hierarchies: a senior role can set 
delegation rights for its junior roles by specifying an 
optional delegation rule (See Figure 2). This role-
based delegation serves as the basis of trust in 
creating role mappings across multiple domains for 
federated information sharing. For instance, a 
Manager role in domain A might delegate his/her 
privileges to an Employee role in domain B. (Roles in 
other domains may be referenced in a delegation rule 
using XML namespaces.) Therefore, the domain 
administrator in domain A would allow an 
“equivalent” Employee role from domain B to exercise 
Manager-level privileges, without requiring explicit 
knowledge of domain B’s access control policy.  
Delegated administration requires access to 
a local compliance checker that can compute this 
“equivalence” with respect to the local domain 
policies. The use of a compliance checker to ensure 
compliance of federated requests with local policies 
is a recognized mechanism for preserving local 
autonomy in distributed systems [19]. In our X-
GTRBAC prototype, the compliance checker is 
incorporated into an authorization engine residing in 
each domain. It internally maintains a domain-
specific mapping from the foreign (i.e. federated) 
roles to local roles according to the delegation 
policies of the local domain.  
3.3.2. Lazy Instantiation 
  Domains, together with delegation, allow 
scalable decentralization of policy administration. 7/11 
However, the complexity of policy administration 
remains a concern, since an expressive access control 
policy would require the local authorization engine to 
maintain prohibitive amount of state information. 
The use of credential-based specification in 
our policy framework helps mitigate this concern. A 
credential-based approach allows state information to 
be reduced since the requestor supplies the 
credentials relevant to the access request, facilitating 
lazy instantiation of policy rules. Therefore, the 
policy does not need to be distributed synchronously 
to all enforcement points [19]. In our X-GTRBAC 
prototype, lazy instantiation helps in state-reduction 
while enforcing the policy, since there is no need on 
part of the authorization engine to maintain persistent 
state information, i.e. store the assignment policies 
for all users and resources.  
3.3.3. Credential Federation 
The credential specification in a federated 
system must support federation requirement, as 
outlined earlier. Many existing distributed 
authorization schemes [12-15] do not address this 
requirement due to inherent limitation of their 
credential specification formats, as discussed in 
Section 3.2.1.  
The modular, attribute-based credential 
specification in the X-GTRBAC framework allows 
credential federation through the use of interoperable 
protocols. In fact, the on-going work on our 
prototype has assumed a SAML-compliant format for 
authentication credentials. SAML standard [7] states 
that authentication information may be available in 
various forms, such as X.509 Attribute Certificates, 
Kerberos tickets or passwords. We employ 
appropriate translation mechanisms for them to be 
used with our X-GTRBAC syntax. Since our rule 
specification supports combing rules from multiple 
policy sources, this allows use of our specification in 
situations when multiple policies are necessary to 
evaluate the request of a federated user.   
In addition to credential federation, a related 
requirement is that of providing single sign on (SSO). 
SSO enables persistent authorization support for 
federated users within a single login session. Our 
policy language supports SSO through the inclusion 
of XML Digital Signature in the credential header of 
an authorization credential (See Figure 2). This 
allows the authorization credential to be reused by a 
federated user without getting re-authenticated, 
subject to the acceptance and validity of the digital 
signature. 
3.3.4. Usage Control 
Persistent protection of federated resources 
requires effective usage control mechanisms. 
Traditional access control models do not take this 
usage-oriented view, and hence are inadequate to 
capture the protection requirements associated with 
federated resource sharing.  
  X-GTRBAC framework allows the 
specification of usage-oriented resource protection 
policies as discussed in Section 3.2.2. However, 
enforcement of these policies requires effective 
session management mechanism. In our X-GTRBAC 
prototype, this session management support is 
provided through the implementation of periodicity, 
interval and duration constraints associated with 
resource provisioning and de-provisioning. In 
addition, it also implements trigger-based constraints 
that allow provisioning and de-provisioning actions 
to be conditioned on related events. For example, the 
provisioning of a resource may be automatically 
discontinued when the associated duration constraint 
expires. This set of constraints represents a collection 
of stateful rules that are configured in permission-to-
role assignment policies, and enforced by the session 
management mechanism. Stateful rules help keep the 
complexity of maintaining the policy low. 
3.4. Policy Composition 
An overall X-GTRBAC policy is composed 
from these individual policy components as follows: 
 
<!-- Policy Definition>    ::=   
<Policy policy_id =(id)> 
  <PolicyName> (name) </PolicyName> 
  <!-- XML User Sheet>     
  <!-- XML Role Sheet>     
  <!-- XML Permission Sheet>     
  <!-- XML User-Role Assignment Sheet>     
  <!-- XML Permission-Role Assignment Sheet>     
</Policy> 
 
  The complete X-Grammar policy syntax is 
provided in Appendix A. 
4. System Architecture 
  In this section, we present the system 
architecture of our X-GTRBAC prototype designed 
for access management in a federated environment. 
In particular, we apply our policy framework in a 
federated digital library environment (with read-only 
access). The use of this prototype illustrates the 
design and enforcement of access control policies for 
secure federation of XML-based digital documents. 
XML is increasingly being used as the preferred 
digital format on the Web; therefore we work with 
XML documents. 
  The system architecture is shown in Figure 
7. This architecture is implemented at each 
participating site in the federation. We now highlight 
the role of the key components of the prototype. 
4.1. Policy specification 
XML Document Composition Module 
(XDCM) is used by each participating site to 
compose policy documents. Each site first encodes its 
X-Grammar policy definitions which are then 8/11 
translated into XML schemas using a custom 
translator and exported to XDCM. The policy 
documents are then composed in XML inside the 
XDCM, and verified against the imported schema 
definitions.  
XML Policy Base (XPB) contains all policy 
related XML documents composed by XDCM. These 
include XML User Sheet (XUS), XML Role Sheet 
(XRS), XML Permission Sheet (XPS), XML User to 
Role Assignment Sheet (XURAS), and XML 
Permission to Role Assignment Sheet (XPRAS). 
Also stored in XPB are the constraint definitions, 
including XSoDDef (Figure 3) and XTempConstDef 
(Figure 4). 
XML Schemas and Instances contains actual 
XML documents at a participating site to which the 
users of the federated library will be requesting 
access.  Referenced Object Base constitutes the 
physical objects present in the local system which are 
referenced from within the XML documents. Note 
that binary encoding allows objects to be embedded 
within XML documents, and those objects may 
themselves be protected resources. 
As is the usual case, the default policy of the 
federation is no authorization, i.e. no user is 
authorized to access any document unless there exists 
an explicit rule granting him/her an authorization. 
4.2. Policy enforcement 
  Upon receiving an access request, the 
Access Control Module (ACM) extracts the policy 
information from the policy base and works closely 
with the XPB to enforce the authorization constraints 
on the release of the request resource. The access 
request may either be from a local or a federated user. 
In the latter case, it is received as a SAML assertion. 
If the requested resource is not available within the 
system, the ACM simply returns (or appropriately 
redirects) the request. Otherwise, it proceeds as 
follows. 
As a first step, the ACM forwards the access 
request to the Credential Evaluator (CrE). CrE 
evaluates the credential presented in the request 
forwarded by the ACM. (If the request was received 
as a SAML assertion, it is first translated to X-
GTRBAC format.) Based on the credential type (i.e. 
authentication or authorization), CrE does the 
following. If it is an authentication credential, CrE 
assigns the user to an appropriate role within the 
system according to the user-to-role assignment 
policy after consulting the XPB. If it is an 
authorization credential (meaning that it is an SSO 
request), it already includes the role of the federated 
user in his/her original domain. In this case, CrE 
invokes the Role Mapper (RM) to map the user to a 
local role according to the delegation policy of the 
system. After this step, the user acquires the 
privileges of the assigned or mapped role in the local 
system.  
After establishing the role of the user, the 
next step is to determine the authorization of the user 
to access the requested resource. In this step, ACM 
forwards the access request together with currently 
available contextual information to the Context 
Evaluator (CoE). This contextual information may 
include attributes such as time of day, system load, as 
noted earlier. CoE  first evaluates the contextual 
information provided by the ACM. It uses this 
information to then evaluate the authorization request 
Figure 7: The system architecture for federated digital library prototype 
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according to the permission-to-role assignment policy 
after consulting the XPB. The result of the evaluation 
is returned to ACM, together with any applicable 
resource provisioning constraints retrieved from 
XPB, as discussed in Section 3.2.2.  
As a final step, the ACM forwards the 
authorization information to the XIG. XIG retrieves 
the access rights of the requesting user on the 
requested XML document, and accordingly generates 
XML views in response to the request. Such XML 
views are cached in XML Instance Base (XIB). 
Session Management Module (SMM) is responsible 
for monitoring the provisioning and de-provisioning 
constraints associated with the requested document, 
as described in Section 3.3.4.  The ACM, SMM, and 
XIG together constitute the XML Access Control 
Processor (ACP). 
5. Related Work 
While using policies for management of 
systems is not an entirely novel concept, and has 
been applied previously in the context of network 
systems management [20], the policy-based approach 
for access management in federated systems has not 
been deeply investigated. 
One notable example of policy-based 
language for systems management is Ponder 
[Ponder]. Ponder is a declarative policy language 
with the ability to support authorization and 
delegation policies, as well as obligation policies 
(which are condition-action rules, much like trigger-
based constraints in our framework). However, 
authorization policies in Ponder are primarily aimed 
at allowing network users to manage network objects, 
with known user groups and object locations, and are 
therefore inadequate for a federated environment 
where users and resources are not identified in 
advance. It therefore does not support credential 
specification and federation requirements for access 
management in federated systems discussed in the 
paper.  
 Ponder supports specification of contextual 
constraints, based on temporal and non-temporal 
parameters. However, contextual constraint 
specification is tied into the authorization policies, 
which reduces their modularity, and hence flexibility. 
Ponder also supports specification of SoD constraints 
through the use of meta-policies. However, the 
specification is at user-level, and is more complicated 
to maintain in a federated environment as opposed to 
a role-based SoD constraint. On the other hand, 
Ponder is well suited to the task that it is designed 
for, i.e. network services management. It has a well-
developed management toolkit that allows policy 
specification, deployment, and dynamic adaptation 
suitable for a network environment.   
  The access control model for federated 
systems presented in [3] is based on a tightly coupled 
architecture. It concerns with defining principles for 
designing access control policies in federated 
systems, and does not deal with policy-based 
management issues. It therefore does not address the 
particular issues related to credential specification, 
credential federation, usage control or session 
management highlighted in this paper. 
[22] presents an RBAC model for federated 
information systems. This system supports credential 
federation and SSO. However, it does not support all 
of our design requirements, including specification of 
semantic or contextual constraints, and usage-
oriented resource protection policies. 
Various policy models have earlier been 
used for access control in centralized and traditional 
distributed systems, but not many approaches have 
been designed to meet the requirements for policy-
based access management in federated systems as 
described in this paper.  Akenti [23] and Permis [24] 
are access control systems which use policies 
encoded in X.509 attribute certificates. Both assume 
authenticated credentials to be used for issuance of 
authorization certificates, much like our approach. 
Akenti supports discretionary access control (i.e. 
identity based), leading to rule explosion in policy 
rule set. Permis uses role-based access control; it, 
however, does not provide support for specification 
and enforcement of user-to-role and role-to-
permission assignment policies. Both these schemes 
also provide no support for specification of semantic 
or contextual constraints, and usage-oriented resource 
protection policies. 
Shibboleth [25] and Liberty Alliance [26] 
define protocols for attribute-based authentication in 
support of SSO in Web-based environments. The 
attributes in Shibboleth are always acquired from 
his/her home site by the resource provider, whereas 
those in Liberty Alliance protocol can be provided by 
any identity provider on the Internet. Liberty Alliance 
protocol therefore establishes a circle of trust 
between identity provider and resource providers. 
Both schemes provide particular emphasis on user 
privacy, and the identity of the user is not known to 
the resource provider. However, the role of these 
schemes is limited to distributed authentication, and 
providing attribute information for a user to be used 
in authorization decisions. They do not include 
mechanisms for specifying and enforcing 
authorization policies. 
With reference to our emphasis on usage 
control, a relevant work appears in [27]. It presents a 
usage control specification to extend the capabilities 
of traditional access control models to support 
resource protection policies. They provide a logic 10/11 
defining states, authorizations, and actions relevant to 
resource usage, and use the notion of mutable 
attributes to allow state transitions and enforce usage 
control. The significant contribution of the model is 
that it provides logic-based semantics of usage 
control. However, it does not provide an enforcement 
mechanism.  
SAML [7] and XACML [8] are emerging 
specifications aimed at addressing different aspects 
of distributed access management. As noted earlier, 
SAML primarily provides a mechanism for credential 
federation, but does not provide any policies for use 
of those credentials. Also, SAML does not 
incorporate a way to establish trust between business 
partners exchanging credentials. XACML provides 
support for policy specification for expressing access 
control policies. It can be configured to support role-
based access control and usage-oriented resource 
protection policies.  It, however, primarily acts only 
as a PDP (Policy Decision Point) and lacks the 
temporal infrastructure to enforce the access control 
policy, such as the session management mechanism 
to enforce usage control in our framework. Our 
framework can therefore provide the functionality of 
both a PDP and a PEP (Policy Enforcement Point). 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have presented the salient 
features of our X-GTRBAC policy framework for 
access management in federated systems. Our 
framework has been designed to address the key 
challenges for developing access control policies for 
federated information sharing. In particular, it 
supports: (i) decentralized administration while 
preserving local autonomy through the use of trust 
relationships captured through role-base delegation, 
(ii) fine-grained access control while avoiding rule-
explosion in the policy through a succinct declarative 
credential specification, (iii) credential federation 
through the use of interoperable protocols, with 
support for single sign on for federated users, (iv) 
specification and enforcement of semantic and 
contextual constraints to support integrity 
requirements and contractual obligations, and (v) 
usage control in resource provisioning through 
effective session management.  
The resource protection requirements in our 
framework are related to the Digital Rights 
Management (DRM) approach [28]. DRM, however, 
is a much broad notion, and also includes 
mechanisms for protection of resources while outside 
the administrative control of the owner. This usually 
requires self-protection mechanisms, i.e. the use of 
embedded features (such as watermarks). We only 
deal with policies for resource protection under 
administrative control of the owner, and do not make 
assumptions about physical protection of resources. 
There are other aspects of access 
management that need to be incorporated in our 
policy framework. Our current approach for role 
mapping abides by the local autonomy principle, and 
hence no form of external access mediation is 
necessitated. In a more general case, this may be 
overly-restrictive, and mediation mechanisms may be 
necessary to fairly regulate federated information 
sharing while ensuring security of federated 
resources. Composing an access mediation policy in 
a federated system poses considerable challenge 
since participating sites do not have a-priori 
knowledge of each other’s access control polices.  
Also, our framework currently supports only 
read-only access to resources. An update access 
mode is also desirable in many collaborative 
situations. However, the session management 
mechanisms need to be significantly enhanced to 
guarantee consistency of updateable federated 
resources during and across provisioning sessions. 
These challenges are likely to be addressed as part of 
future work. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
X-GTRBAC Grammar 
[Basic Definitions] 
<!-- Policy Definition>  ::=<Policy policy_id =(id)> 
  <PolicyName> (name) </PolicyName> 
  <!-- XML User Sheet>     
  <!-- XML Role Sheet>     
  <!-- XML Permission Sheet>     
  <!-- XML User-Role Assignment Sheet>     
  <!-- XML Permission-Role Assignment Sheet>     
   [<!-- Local Policy Definitions>] 
    [<!-- Policy Relationship Definitions>] 
</Policy> 
<!-- XML User Sheet>     ::=<XUS [xus_id = (id) ]>  
  [<!-- Definitions of Credential Types>] 
 <!--  User  Definitions> 
</XUS> 
<!-- Definitions of Credential Types>   
 ::= <XCredType [xctd_id = (id) ] >  
  [<!-- Credential Type Definition>]+ 
</XCredType> 
<!-- Credential Type Definition>     
::=        <CredType cred_type_id = (id)                                                                                              
type_name= (type name) > 
  <!-- Attribute List> 
</CredType >  
<!-- Attribute List>   ::= <AttributeList> 
  [<!--  Attribute  Definition>]+   
</AttributeList> 
<!-- Attribute Definition>  ::  <Attribute> 
 < AttributeName usage = “mand | opt”  
  type  =  (type)> (name) </AttributeName >   
</Attribute> 
<!-- User Definitions >   ::=<Users> 
   [<!--  User  Definition>]+ 
</Users> 
<!-- User Definition>   ::=         <User user_id = (id)>  
  <UserName>[(name)]</UserName> 
  < ! — C r e d T y p e >  
  <MaxRoles>(number)</MaxRoles>     
 </User> 
<!—CredType  >  ::=  <CredType cred_type_id = (id)     
         type_name= (type name) > 
 [<!—Header>]   
  <!-- Credential Expression>   
</CredType> 
<!-- Credential Expression >  ::= <CredExpr mode= 
(identity | capability | property)>    
   <!-- AttributeValuePairs> 
   <!-- DomainSet>  
</CredExpr> 
<!-- AttributeValuePairs> ::=    [<(attribute name)> ( attribute 
value)  </(attribute name)>] +        
<!-- XML Role Sheet>   ::=<XRS [xrs_id = (id) ]>  
   [<!-- Role Definition>]+ 
</XRS> 
<!-- Role Definition>     ::=<Role role_id = (id)  
             role_name = (role name)> 
 [<!—Header>]   
  <!-- Credential Expression>   
 [<!—(En|Dis)abling  Constraint>] 
 [<!—[De]Activation  Constraint>] 
 ( <SSDRoleSetID> (id) </SSDRoleSetID>)* 
   (<DSDRoleSetID> (id) </DSDRoleSetID>)* 
 
 
 
  [<Junior> (name) </Junior>] 
  [<Senior> (name) </Senior>] 
  [<LinkedRole type=(delegator |   
delegatee)>(name)</LinkedRole>] 
  [<!—Delegation Constraint>]   
  [<Cardinality> (number) </Cardinality>] 
</Role>  
<!-- Separation of Duty Definitions>  
::=      <XSoDDef [xsod_id = (id) ]>  
          <!—SoDRoleSets> 
         </XSoDDef> 
<!-- SoDRoleSets >::= 
   [<!—SSDRoleSets>]    [<!—DSDRoleSets>] 
<!-- SSDRoleSets > ::=        <SSDRoleSets> 
   [<!—SSDRoleSet>]+     
   </SSDRoleSets> 
<!—SSDRoleSet> ::=       <SSDRoleSet>     
    [ <SSDRole ssd_role_set_id =(id)     
     ssd_cardinality  =  (number)> 
    (role name)         
   </SSDRole>]+      
 </SSDRoleSet> 
<!-- DomainSet>   ::=        <DomainSet>     
   [<!—DomainID>]+  
</DomainSet> 
<!-- DomainID>::=        <DomainID>(id)</DomainID> 
<!-- DSDRoleSets >   ::=        <DSDRoleSets> 
 [<!—DSDRoleSet>]+   
  </DSDRoleSets> 
<!—DSDRoleSet>::=       <DSDRoleSet>     
  [<DSDRole  dsd_role_set_id  =(id) 
    dsd_cardinality  =  (number)> 
    (role name)        
 </DSDRole>]+         
 </DSDRoleSet> 
<!-- XML Permission Sheet>::=<XPS [xps_id = (id) ]> 
  [<!-- Permission Definition>]+      
</XPS> 
<!-- Permission Definition>  ::= 
<Permission perm_id = id  [prop= (prop op)] > 
<Object type= (type name)  id= (id)>  
 [<!--  Attributes>] 
</Object> 
<Operation> (access op) </Operation> 
<!-- DomainSet> 
</Permission> 
<!-- XML User-Role Assignment Sheet>::= 
<XURAS [xuras_id = (id) ]> 
 [<!--  User-role  Assignment>]+     
</XURAS>    
<!-- User-role Assignment>::= 
<URA ura_id=(id)  role_name=(name)>   
  <AssignUsers> 
  [<  !—Assign  User>]+     
  </AssignUsers> 
</URA> 
<!—[De]Assign User >                 ::=
  <[De]AssignUser user_id=(id)>      
  <!—[De]Assign Constraint >   
 </[De]AssignUser> 
<!-- XML Permission-Role Assignment Sheet>::= 
 
  
 
<XPRAS [xpras_id = (id) ]> 
  [<!-- Permission-Role Assignment>]+      
</XPRAS>        
<!-- Permission-Role Assignment>::= 
  <PRA pra_id=(id)   role_name=(name)>                      
 <AssignPermissions> 
     [<!—Assign Permission>]+       
</AssignPermissions> 
</PRA> 
< !—[De]Assign Permission>      ::=               
<[De]AssignPermission perm_id=(id)>           
<!—[De]Assign Constraint > 
</[De]AssignPermission> 
<!—[De]Assign Constraint> ::=
  <[De]AssignConstraint[op =(AND|OR|NOT|XOR)]>  
  // opcode defaults to AND if none specified 
  [<!—[De] Assign Condition>]+ 
</[De]AssignConstraint> 
<!—[De]Assign Condition>  ::= 
<[De]AssignCondition cred_type=(type name)                                   
   [pt_expr_id=(id) | d_expr_id=(id)] >      
    [<!-- Logical Expression>]     
</[De]AssignCondition>      
<!—(En|Dis)abling Constraint>   ::=
  <(En|Dis)abConstraint[op = (AND|OR|NOT)]>  
    // opcode defaults to AND if none specified 
  [<!--  (En|Dis)abling  Condition>]+ 
 </(En|Dis)abConstraint> 
<!—(En|Dis)abling Condition>  ::=
  <(En|Dis)abCondition [pt_expr_id=(id) | 
                        d_expr_id=(id)] >      
   [<!-- Logical Expression>]    
 </(En|Dis)abCondition>   
<!—[De]Activation Constraint> ::= 
  <[De] ActivConstraint[op = (AND|OR|NOT)]>  
     // opcode defaults to AND if none specified 
  [<!—[De]ActivationCondition>]+  
 </[De]ActivConstraint> 
<!—[De]Activation Condition>  ::=
  <[De]ActivCondition [d_expr_id=(id)]>      
   <!-- Logical Expression>]  
 </[De]ActivCondition  >      
<!-- Logical Expression> ::= 
<LogicalExpr [op = (AND|OR|NOT)]>  
  // opcode defaults to AND if none specified 
 [<!--  Predicate>]+   
</LogicalExpr> 
<!--  Predicate>       ::=  <Predicate> 
   {  <Operator> (gt|lt|eq|neq) </Operator> 
  [<FuncName>(name)</FuncName>]  
   [<ParamName>(name)</ParamName>]+ 
  <RetValue>(value)</RetValue> } 
 |  < !--LogicalExpression> 
</Predicate> 
 
[Temporal Definitions] 
 
<!-- Definitions of Temporal Constraints>::=
  <XTempConstDef [xtcd_id = (id) ]>  
        [<!—Interval Expression>] 
    [<!-- Periodic Time Expression>]  
     [<!-- Duration Expression>] 
</XTempConstDef> 
<!-- Periodic Time Expression>    ::=
 < PeriodicTimeExpr pt_expr_id = ( i d )                           
 <!--  Start  Time  Expression>           
</PeriodicTimeExpr> 
<!—Interval Expression> ::= 
<IntervalExpr i_expr_id = (id)> 
<begin> (date)</begin>  
 <end>(date)</end>     
</IntervalExpr> 
<!-- Start Time Expression>  ::=  <StartTimeExpr 
[pt_id_ref = (pt_id)]> 
 [ <Year>(all|odd|even) /<Year>] 
 [<!--MonthSet>] 
 [<!--WeekSet>] 
 [<!--DaySet>] 
</StartTimeExpr> 
<!--MonthSet>   ::=<MonthSet> 
 (<Month>(1|..|12)</Month>)1-12     
  (represents # of months from the start of current Year) 
</MonthSet > 
< ! - - W e e k S e t >        : : =   <WeekSet> 
 (<Week>(1|..|4)</Week>)1-4 
    (represents # of weeks from the start of current Month) 
</WeekSet > 
< ! - - D a y S e t >         : : =   <DaySet> 
 (<Day>(1|..|7)</Day>)1-7 
  (represents # of days from the start of current Week) 
</DaySet > 
<!-- Duration Expression>  ::=   
<DurationExpr  d_expr_id = (id)> 
 < cal>(Years|Months|Weeks|Days)</cal> 
 < len> (number)</len> 
</DurationExpr> 
 
[TM Credential Definitions] 
 
<!--Header>            ::=   <Header>      
    <!--  Principal >     
    <!--  Issuer >     
    <!--  Validity>     
     [<!--  Digital Signature >]   
     </Header> 
<!--  Issuer>     ::=   <Issuer> 
 <!--  Principal> 
 </Issuer>  
<!-- Principal>::=  <Principal short_name = (ID)>    
   { < PublicKey>(Hash ID)</PublicKey>  |       
     < NameToken>(String)</NameToken>} 
</Principal>  
<!-- Validity>       ::=  <Validity>
  <IssueTime>(xs:dateTime)</IssueTime>        
 [ <NotBefore>(xs:dateTime)</NotBefore>]  
 [ <NotAfter>(xs:dateTime)</NotAfter>]     
 </Validity> 
<!--  Digital Signature >   ::= <DSig>  
 ( ds:Signature) </DSig> 
<!--  Hash ID >   ::=  xs:base64Binary  
<!—Delegation Constraint>    ::=  
<DelegationConstraint [op = (AND|OR|NOT)]>  
  // opcode defaults to AND if none specified 
[<!-- Delegation Condition>]+        
<!—Delegation Condition>          ::=
 <DelegationCondition  [pt_expr_id=(id) | 
                  d_expr_id=(id)] >      
     [<!-- Logical Expression>] 
</DelegationCondition> 
   
 
APPENDIX B 
 
XML Instances 
 
 
[Temporal Constraint Definition and Assignment Policy] 
 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
 
<XTempConstDef xtcd_id="IFIP_XTCD">  
  <IntervalExpr i_expr_id="Year2005"> 
        <begin>1/1/2005</begin> 
        <end>12/31/2005</end> 
  </IntervalExpr>   
  <DurationExpr d_expr_id="SixWeeks"> 
        <cal>Weeks</cal> 
        <len>6</len> 
  </DurationExpr>       
  <DurationExpr d_expr_id="OneWeek"> 
        <cal>Weeks</cal> 
        <len>1</len> 
  </DurationExpr>       
  <PeriodicTimeExpr 
pt_expr_id="PTQuarterWeekSeven" 
i_expr_id="Year2005" d_expr_id="SixWeeks">      
    <StartTimeExpr> 
        <Year>all</Year> 
        <MonthSet> 
            <Month>1</Month> 
            <Month>4</Month> 
            <Month>7</Month> 
            <Month>10</Month> 
        </MonthSet> 
        <WeekSet> 
            <Week>7</Week>             
        </WeekSet>                 
    </StartTimeExpr> 
  </PeriodicTimeExpr>   
</XTempConstDef> 
 
Figure B.1: This temporal constraint definition includes a periodic 
time expression (PTE) which states that the access is allowed 
beginning the seventh week of every quarter of year 2005, and is 
allowed for a duration of six weeks. Note that duration expression 
and interval expression are referenced inside a PTE. 
 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
 
<XURAS xuras_id="IFIP_XURAS"> 
 <URA ura_id="uraBorrow" role_name="Borrower"> 
  <AssignUsers> 
   <AssignUser user_id="any"> 
    <AssignConstraint>        
      <AssignCondition cred_type="SAML" 
pt_expr_id="PTQuarterWeekSeven">   
       <LogicalExpr op="AND">                  
        <Predicate> 
         <LogicalExpr op="OR"> 
           <Predicate> 
             <Operator>eq</Operator> 
             <FuncName>exists</FuncName> 
             <ParamName>DLN</ParamName> 
             <RetValue>true</RetValue> 
           </Predicate> 
           <Predicate> 
             <Operator>eq</Operator> 
             <FuncName>exists</FuncName> 
             <ParamName>SSN</ParamName> 
             <RetValue>true</RetValue> 
           </Predicate> 
         </LogicalExpr> 
        </Predicate> 
        <Predicate> 
         <Operator>gt</Operator>  
         <FuncName>hasValue</FuncName> 
         <ParamName>valid_date</ParamName> 
         <RetValue>DEC2005</RetValue> 
        </Predicate> 
       </LogicalExpr> 
      </AssignCondition>        
    </AssignConstraint> 
   </AssignUser>    
  </AssignUsers>   
 </URA> 
</XURAS>  
Figure B.2: This is a role assignment policy for the Borrower role 
in the federated digital library system. It states that any user (any is 
a keyword) can be assigned to this role if he/she supplies a SAML 
authentication credential supporting the following conditions: (i) 
credential has an attribute asserting the existence of a DLN or SSN 
for the user, and (ii) the credential is valid beyond DEC 2005. 
Additionally, the PTE of Figure B.1 is referenced in the assignment 
policy to constrain the applicable time period of the policy.  
 